Explicating "Implicit Interaction" : An Examination of the Concept and Challenges for Research by Serim, Baris & Jacucci, Giulio
Explicating “Implicit Interaction”: An Examination of
the Concept and Challenges for Research
Barış Serim
Helsinki Institute for Information Technology HIIT,
Department of Computer Science, University of Helsinki
Department of Design, Aalto University, Finland
baris.serim@helsinki.fi
Giulio Jacucci
Helsinki Institute for Information Technology HIIT,
Department of Computer Science, University of Helsinki
giulio.jacucci@helsinki.fi
ABSTRACT
The term implicit interaction is often used to denote inter-
actions that differ from traditional purposeful and attention
demanding ways of interacting with computers. However,
there is a lack of agreement about the term’s precise meaning.
This paper develops implicit interaction further as an analytic
concept and identifies the methodological challenges related
to HCI’s particular design orientation. We first review mean-
ings of implicit as unintentional, attentional background,
unawareness, unconsciousness and implicature, and com-
pare them in regards to the entity they qualify, the design
motivation they emphasize and their constructive validity
for what makes good interaction. We then demonstrate how
the methodological challenges can be addressed with greater
precision by using an updated, intentionality-based defini-
tion that specifies an input–effect relationship as the entity
of implicit. We conclude by identifying a number of new
considerations for design and evaluation, and by reflecting
on the concepts of user and system agency in HCI.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Human-centered computing→HCI theory, concepts
and models; User models.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The last two decades witnessed an increasing interest in sup-
porting interactions that differ from traditional purposeful
and attention demanding ways of engaging with computers.
A term that is often used to denote these new types of user
engagements is “implicit interaction”. Implicit interactions
are now being pursued in domains as diverse as ubiquitous
interaction [83], information seeking [18, 54, 99], attentive in-
terfaces [95, 106] and physiological computing [28]. A public
display that shows content when it senses human presence
or a recommendation engine that utilizes user actions for
social recommendations are typical examples. As computers
are getting increasingly capable of sensing the environment
and making inferences about the situation, we can expect
similar interactions to proliferate and partly replace what is
called “explicit interactions”.
At the same time, there is a lack of consensus regarding
the precise meaning of the explicit–implicit distinction. Over
time, the distinction has come to serve as a placeholder for
different meanings such as intentionality, attentional focus
and awareness. The terms are generally used as a quality
of interaction (itself a concept with diverse interpretations
[44]), but it is common to apply them to other entities such
as the interface, the input or the sensing capability of the
system. When the terms do qualify interaction, they are of-
ten described through built-in properties of the interface
rather than the interaction as it unfolds. Adding to the confu-
sion are other distinctions such as foreground–background
[15], overt–covert, command–non-command [64] and active–
passive [25] that have overlapping meanings and at times
used interchangeably with explicit–implicit. The broad use
of the terms led to the introduction of other, more strictly
formulated distinctions such as intentional–incidental [21]
and reactive–proactive [51].
The ambiguity is problematic, firstly because the term im-
plicit interaction has become part of the HCI lexicon. Even
though an ambiguous understanding of the term can func-
tion as a convenient shorthand, its effective use requires
researchers to clarify what they mean by implicit interaction,
validate whether an interface actually facilitates implicit in-
teractions, and demonstrate that implicitness informs design
or evaluation in a way other concepts do not. Otherwise, the
term risks either being redundant or obscuring more than
it explains. Perhaps more consequentially, however, we find
the ambiguity exposed by the various uses of the term repre-
sentative of broader methodological challenges concerning
a very central phenomenon in HCI, namely the relationship
between a user’s mental attitude and what is considered
appropriate system behavior.
Thus, we see value in developing “implicit interaction”
further as an analytic concept. In the following sections, we
first review and compare different meanings that the term
implicit stands for in HCI, psychology and pragmatics, and
identify the methodological challenges concerning HCI’s
particular design orientation. We then revisit these method-
ological challenges with an updated, intentionality-based
definition of implicit interaction as user’s attitude towards
an input–effect relationship in which the appropriateness of a
system response to the user input (i.e., an effect) does not rely
on the user having conducted the input to intentionally achieve
it, and show how this updated definition can be deployed to
address various methodological challenges. We conclude by
identifying a number of new considerations for the design
and evaluation of interfaces that aim to facilitate implicit
interactions, and by reflecting on the concepts of user and
system agency in HCI.
2 THE MANY MEANINGS OF IMPLICIT
The HCI use of the term implicit can be traced back to as
early as 1983, when Revesman and Greenstein noted that “if
the computer were able to predict accurately the actions of the
human, information would be communicated with no overt
communication on the part of the human; an implicit line of
communication would exist” [78, p. 107]. The term has since
appeared in different domains of HCI such as mobile comput-
ing [37, 43] search interfaces [18] and ubiquitous computing
[63, 84]. Various formulations of implicit interaction soon
followed. Schmidt defines implicit interaction as “an action
performed by the user that is not aimed to interact with a
computerised system but which such a system understands
as input” [83]. This is somehow echoed in Ju and Leifer’s
definition of implicit interaction as “those that occur without
the explicit behest or awareness of the user” [52]. While these
formulations provide good departure points, they also lead
to many further questions. Does implicit stands for purpose-
fulness, awareness or any other meaning? Is it a quality of
“an action performed by the user” or something that occurs
as a result of an action? Ameta-analysis that compares differ-
ent meanings and implications of “implicit” has so far been
missing.
Equally problematic is the term “interaction”. Perspectives
on interaction, such as Norman’s dialogue model [65], con-
trol theory [100] and activity theory [10], take user goals as
a departure point for their analyses, which poses a challenge
for the notion of interaction as something unintentional
[21, 44]. Similarly, when defined through a complete lack
of attentional focus or awareness, implicit interaction has
been called “not proper interaction in the sense that it engages
us in addition... to what we otherwise are doing” [49, p. 122]
and “hardly... an interaction at all, since there is no activity or
awareness on our part” [52, p. 77]. The problem partly arises
from the diverse meanings of implicit but also from the am-
biguity of the word interaction. In HCI, interaction has been
conceptualized in terms of mechanical consequence by an-
tecedent, but also as user experience, tool-use or control [44],
all of which make user attention or intention a prerequisite
for interaction. Additionally, HCI uses are not limited to
interaction and one can encounter other phrases such as “im-
plicit sensing” [38, 81], “implicit input” [53, 75, 93], “implicit
interface” [87, 93] or a specific outcome of user input, as in
“implicit authentication” [13]. The diversity of uses raises
the question of whether (or what entity within) interaction
provides a useful unit of analysis.
This section discusses various meanings and entities that
the term implicit interaction can stand for. There are two
reasons for our focus on the word implicit instead of a prede-
fined meaning. First, we examine how the use of implicit as
a placeholder for multiple meanings might not be accidental
but grounded in the context of particular cases in which
they overlap. Secondly, by comparing and contrasting vari-
ous meanings, we sharpen our own definition of the term.
Overall, our examination is oriented towards identifying the
consequences of different meanings for research rather than
determining their prevalence in the literature. We do not
claim comprehensiveness of all use instances, but refer to
HCI examples for illustration.
We started the examination by identifying a number of
often cited, key publications that discuss the term implicit
interaction in depth [21, 42, 51, 52, 83]. Even though not cited
by key HCI publications, explicit–implicit distinction also
features in other fields, notably psychology and pragmatics,
and work in HCI occasionally reflect similar meanings. Thus,
we found the reviews in these fields [16, 20, 29, 85] useful for
comparison. As we have proceeded, we also expanded the
scope of analysis to other terms that have overlapping mean-
ings and are used interchangeably with explicit–implicit. For
example, Buxton’s [15] distinction of “foreground” “which
are in the fore of human consciousness – intentional” and
Table 1: An overview of different meanings, their description, the entity they qualify and potential motivations for design.
Implicit as Description Implicit qualifies Example motivation for design
Unintentional The degree a particular effect is intended by
the user
Input–effect
relationship
Providing appropriate responses that
go beyond what the user has intended
Attentional
background
Attention reserved during the execution of
an input or evaluation of a system response
Input or output Freeing up attentional resources
through external backgrounding
Unawareness The degree of awareness of a particular effect
caused by the user’s input
Input–effect
relationship
Providing appropriate responses that
go beyond what the user is aware of
Unconscious User’s awareness of own mental process Mental process Reduced need for mental processing
Implicature The degree an action represents an agent’s
intention
Intention–action
relationship
Accomplishing an intended effect
with less effort
“background” activities “that takes place in the periphery”
is conceptually similar and has been used together with
explicit–implicit distinction in later work [e.g., 42, 51]. “In-
cidental” interactions, similarly, describe instances when a
system utilizes user actions that have been “performed for
some other purpose” than the one executed by the system
[21]. These formulations emphasize the purposefulness of
user actions in achieving a specific outcome, a meaning that
we will henceforth refer to as intentionality. However, vari-
ous definitions point to other qualities, namely attentional
focus, awareness, consciousness (psychology) and implicature
(pragmatics).
Implicit as Unintentional
The formulations of explicit–implicit [51, 83] as well as
foreground–background [15, 41] define them in terms of
user’s intentionality. Editing a document by typing on a key-
board is an explicit interaction insofar as the outcome, and
the purpose, of the action is editing the document. In con-
trast, a smart room that activates the lights when a person
walks in facilitates implicit interaction (unless the person
walked into the room specifically to turn on the lights).
A defining feature of implicit interactions is their occur-
rence as a result of the user input. Perhaps due to this fea-
ture, implicit has occasionally been defined as a quality of
user’s “action” (as in Schmidt’s definition [83]) or “input”
[e.g., 1, 53, 75, 93]. Yet we argue that the suitable entity for
intentionality is a specific outcome that results from user’s
input, namely an input–effect relationship. This is first of
all due to our focus on human–computer interaction where
intentionality is categorically about future states in the en-
vironment. Of course, the user input itself can be consid-
ered unintentional in certain cases (as in involuntary muscle
movements), but this qualifies a mind–behavior relationship
instead of a user–environment relationship. Apart from cat-
egorical precision, defining implicitness as an input–effect
relationship allows for including situations in which the sys-
tem executes both intended and unintended effects as a result
of the user input. For example, a search system can harness a
user’s browsing or bookmarking actions that are intended for
examining web pages as implicit relevance feedbacks to infer
user interests and improve future search results [2, 76, 99].
Most accounts of HCI view user intentions central to what
makes a good interaction, in other words, postulating the
norm that an interaction is judged by [44]. Thus, the defini-
tion of implicit interactions as unintentional has been scruti-
nized. From a control theory perspective, Williamson defines
background interactions as ideally dependent on “known in-
tentions and the inferred intentions which they act as proxy for”
[100, p. 23]. We argue that the objection is due to the multi-
ple meanings of interaction, which can refer to a granular
input–effect relationship but also to an activity conducted
through an interactive system. In many examples described
above, even if a specific effect of the user input is uninten-
tional, implicit interaction can be motivated by a purposeful
activity that encompasses the specific input–effect relation-
ship. For example, implicit feedback in search systems can
be motivated through a user’s goal of seeking particular in-
formation. In contrast, when there are no commitments to
inferred intentions, the interaction can be motivated by the
assumed benefit to the user [21]. In other words, beneficial
or any other quality can replace intentional as the norm of
interaction.
We so far treated intentionality as self-evident. Yet it is
worth noting that the HCI understandings of the concept
range from a general “directedness of meaning” [24] to “the
decision to act so as to achieve the goal” as in Norman’s
framework [65]. The difference in HCI understandings can be
traced back to the philosophical conceptions of intentionality
in mentalistic (as in Husserl and Searle) and non-mentalistic
(as in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty) terms (see Dreyfus
[26, 27] for a treatment of the subject). As a mentalistic con-
cept, intentions correspond to well-formulated goals that are
held by a knowing subject. In its non-mentalistic conception,
intentions are instead embodied in our everyday habitual
performance toward practical ends and characterize things
that we do without self-reflection. This partly amounts to
the expansion of intentionality from the mind and deliberate
reasoning to the body, habits and unconsciousness—another
meaning that we will unpack later in this section. However,
unconsciousness tells only part of the story. An insight from
phenomenology as well as from the situated action perspec-
tive [90] is that successful accomplishment of activities relies
on background assumptions, namely external dependencies
that are taken for granted until a breakdown. Implicit inter-
actions in HCI approximate to such external dependencies
when they assume embodied knowledge on users’ side about
what to take for granted.
Implicit as Attentional Background
Implicit [49, 51] or background [15, 41] interactions have
also been defined in terms of attentional focus during inter-
action. HCI research is often informed by the limitations to
the human processing capacity [e.g., 6, 46, 69], which, as a
consequence, requires selectivity regarding what is being
attended to. Researchers directed their design efforts to make
interactive systems less attention demanding, for instance,
by devising ambient, peripheral and low-bandwidth output
[48, 74]. The same design strategy can be extended to the
design of input techniques that require minimal user atten-
tion. Manual selection of small targets on a screen is explicit,
while automatic activation of lights upon entering a room is
implicit. Mobile interfaces can switch between landscape and
portrait modes by sensing the device orientation instead of
through attention-demanding GUI control [42, 84]. Systems
can be designed to be operated without fine motor control
to accommodate “casual” user inputs [73].
Buxton defined background interactions as both unin-
tentional and in the attentional background [15], but the
two qualities do not necessarily overlap. Ju et al. build their
implicit interaction framework on Buxton’s foreground–
background distinction but supplement it with an additional
reactive–proactive distinction to separate intentionality from
attentional focus [51]. An interaction can be both intentional
and in the attentional background when the system auto-
mates various sub-tasks triggered by a user input without
providing attention-demanding feedback. Conversely, an
interaction can be at the attentional foreground but exe-
cuted without the user’s initiative, such as when the system
provides attention-demanding feedback for an unintended
effect.
When defined through attentional focus, implicit interac-
tions are motivated by freeing up users’ cognitive resources
for other activities. Level of attention also allows explicit–
implicit or foreground–background distinctions to be defined
across a continuum [15, 41] in which attention serves as a
quantitative measure that can be operationalized through
information throughput [15, 73].
Implicit as Unawareness
We use the term awareness to denote users’ knowledge about
how their input is utilized by the system. Traditional inter-
face design has put heavy emphasis on the predictability of
action outcomes through affordances and feedback/feedforward
mechanisms that communicate system responses back to
users [65]. In contrast, interfaces that target implicit interac-
tion might avoid such features. Implicitness has occasionally
been defined in terms of awareness [52, 56, 71]. Typing into
a computer is explicit as long as users are aware of the action
outcomes, while the utilization of users’ gaze [71] or physio-
logical signals [56] without their awareness is implicit. As
with attention, awareness can be defined as a continuum.
Users can be unaware that they are providing input to a sys-
tem, they can have ambiguous awareness about how their
input is utilized by the system or they can be fully informed
[97]. For more granular analysis, users can be considered to
have varying degrees of awareness of different effects that
result from the same input.
Purposefulness of interaction requires a certain degree
of awareness of action outcomes, making awareness a pre-
condition for intentionality. Thus, the motivations that are
described under unintentional also apply to unawareness. On
the other hand, awareness does not always entail intentional-
ity. Dix distinguishes between awareness and intentionality
through the concept of “expected” interactions in which the
user is aware of the effect of his or her action but has not
performed the action with the intention to cause the partic-
ular effect [21]. Paraphrasing Dix’s example, a person can
expect the lights to switch on when entering a room, even
though this is not the intention for entering. Dix’s other cat-
egory “incidental” refers to interactions where the outcome
is neither intentional nor expected.
Implicit as Unconscious
Implicit–explicit distinction can also be defined through con-
sciousness. This meaning is prevalent in psychology and
related fields.1 Implicit learning is a process by which knowl-
edge is acquired “independently of conscious attempts to
do so” [77, p. 219]. Implicit memory is the facilitation of
1The precise definition of implicit and how it relates to other concepts
such as voluntariness, verbalization or intentionality has been extensively
discussed in different domains of psychology [20, 29, 85]. Here, instead of
an in-depth discussion of different psychological concepts, we will limit
our scope to what we perceive to be a salient concept, consciousness, and
outline how it differs from the HCI meanings discussed earlier.
performance “without conscious recollection” [82, p. 501].
The meaning of the term is similar in social psychology
[29, 33, 102] where implicit social cognition is “unconscious”
in the sense that it is “unavailable to self-report or introspec-
tion” [33, p. 5]. Researchers employed experimental tech-
niques such as Implicit Association Test (IAT) [34] tomeasure
“implicit attitudes” towards age, gender and other socially
relevant attributes [67, 79]. The definition of the term con-
sciousness is contested, but generally corresponds to “online
phenomenological awareness” (i.e., awareness of one’s own
mental processes) [85, p. 138]. Unconscious processes are
described as faster, more efficient but also harder to modify
and verbalize than conscious processes [85].
Some work in HCI employs this meaning of the term
but without targeting implicit interactions as a design goal.
Poeller et al. study “implicit motives” ([61]) to predict video
gamers’ behavior and play experience [72]. Denning et al. uti-
lize the “implicit memory” of users to aid password recovery
[19]. Additionally, we observe that motivations for facilitat-
ing implicit interactions occasionally evoke the unconscious
meaning of the term. Consider Schmidt’s reference to non-
verbal cues during face-to-face communication: “In many
cases the robustness of human-to-human communication is
based on the implicitly introduced contextual information, such
as gestures, body language, and voice” [83, p. 91]. It can be ar-
gued that gestures are part of a person’s purposeful social act,
but their realization is more or less automatic or unreflective;
they are intentional but not deliberate. The term “internally
backgrounded” (as opposed to both “foregrounded” and “ex-
ternally backgrounded” [62]) denotes a similar distinction.
Execution of tasks without conscious processing has been
related to skilled, well-practiced behavior [55, 62, 66].
Implicit as unconscious qualifies the mental process that
leads to an action rather than the relationship between the
user action and its effect. To illustrate the point, whether
the user action was unconscious (e.g., walking into a room
without thinking about it) or its outcome was unintended
(e.g., turning on the lights when walking into the room) point
to different aspects of an action. Implicit as such also hints at
an internal division (“internally backgrounded” [62]) rather
than to the division of labor between the user and the system
(“externally backgrounded” [62]). For this reason, Ju et al.
argued for its exclusion from the scope of implicit interaction
by advocating a distinction between “situations where users
don’t have to think and plan because the users have developed
tacit knowledge of how to operate a task, and situations where
the users don’t have to think and plan because the system is
acting proactively on their behalf.” [51, p. 20].
Implicit as Implicature
Finally, implicit can be understood as akin to “implicatures”
[36] (or analogous “indirect speech acts” [86]) in pragmat-
ics, the field that studies the contextual aspects of human
communication. Definitions of implicit in pragmatics [e.g.,
16, 57, 101] often trace back to Grice and his concepts of
speaker’s meaning and “conversational implicature” [35, 36]
where the analytic focus lies on the relationship between
what is said (i.e., the explicit meaning of an utterance) and
what is meant (implied) by a speaker. Consider approaching
to a group of friends before a trip and saying “I am ready”.
In addition to its explicit meaning of stating one’s readiness,
the utterance can be an implicit invitation for departure,
which is a meaning that is intended (implied) by the speaker.
While understood through speaker’s intention, this use of
implicit better corresponds to how literal, as opposed to how
intentional, an utterance is. In fact, what underpins conver-
sational implicatures is a clear demonstration by the speaker
that his or her utterance is directed at the listener. This al-
lows the listener to infer the speaker’s intention by assuming
the relevance of the utterance for the given context [101].
Implicit as such differs from the HCI meaning of implicit as
unintentional and not directed at a computer [e.g., 15, 51, 83].
Some work in HCI conveys the implicature meaning of
the term. Sun et al. distinguish between implicit and explicit
behavior strategies a robot assistant can employ when in-
teracting with a user [91]. The robot assistant can direct a
user’s attention to itself by asking “Hey, listen to me, it’s
important!” (explicit) or by implying that it has something
to communicate by saying “No problem, I will wait for you”.
In this example, implicitness qualifies the relationship be-
tween the system goal (of capturing the user’s attention)
and the system output. Yet implicatures can also qualify the
relationship between users’ intentions and their actions. For
example, to save from effort, a user can intentionally make
an ambiguous query with the expectation that the search
interface will successfully retrieve the intended search result.
Within pragmatics, speakers’ motivations for employing
implicatures have been formulated through various “conver-
sational maxims” [36] or achieving a greater effect on the
hearer with less effort [101]. Similar motivations can explain
HCI equivalents of implicatures. For example, the user and
the system can have a shared understanding that the user
would aim to minimize her effort when communicating her
intentions to the system. This in turn can allow the system
to compensate for seemingly erroneous or ambiguous user
inputs while at the same time affording the user to be less
precise on purpose.
Note that, Gricean view of implicatures conceptualizes
communication as a process of intention recognition. As we
discussed earlier, the mentalism that accompanies this con-
ception is not without controversy and has been scrutinized
from the viewpoint of interactional pragmatics [5, 12, 39, 40].
Interactional pragmatics emphasizes that speakers’ prior in-
tentions are inherently vague and negotiable, and can be
practically observed only through their uptake by the hearer.
A conceptual consequence of this is the reframing of in-
tentions as retrospective accounts that are attributed to the
speaker rather than prior mental states that predetermine the
communication [39]. A methodological consequence is the
shift of the analytical focus from the relationship between
speakers’ utterances and their mental states to the sequen-
tial relationship between speakers’ utterances (as in most
conversation analysis). Parallel discussions played their part
in HCI. Work informed by linguistic pragmatics identified
intent recognition and categorization as primary goals for
system design [4, 103]. Situated action perspective, on the
other hand, emphasized the inherent vagueness of intentions
for prescribing action [90].
Summary
Early in the section, we noted that intentionality is central
to many definitions of implicit, but not always overlapping
with other meanings (Table 1). To summarize, intentional
actions can be conducted with different levels of attention,
lack of awareness rules out intentionality, but awareness
does not necessarily entail intentionality. In contrast, im-
plicatures presume intentionality. Consciousness refers to
internal self-awareness of mental processes, which differs
from the awareness or intentionality of external action out-
comes. Note that, all of the meanings deviate from classical
explicit interactions that assume a straightforward coupling
between users’ mental states, their observable behavior and
what is appropriate. However, they illustrate different ways
in which this can be achieved. They thus relate differently
to the ordinary language use of implicit as “being understood
from something else though unexpressed”2. As implicature,
implicitness qualifies how literally the observable behavior
represents the intention of its agent. As intentionality, implic-
itness describes whether the appropriateness of an effect is
grounded on user intentions (explicit) or additional assump-
tions (implicit). This reference to expected appropriateness
is, in our view, what justifies the term “implicit” instead of
describing the interaction simply as “unintentional”, or any
other word.
Having reviewed different meanings of implicit, we can
also more clearly identify the roots of the confusion with
implicit “interaction”. Simply put, interaction lacks a unified
meaning in the context of implicit; researchers can refer to
2https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/implicit
different entities by “interaction” depending on the partic-
ular meaning of implicit they employ (Table 1). Consider
intentionality; implicit interaction as unintentional can be
problematic when interaction stands for a temporal window
of user engagement (since users are assumed to be intentional
at the activity level) but not when it stands for a granular
input–effect relationship. For attentional focus, implicit can
qualify both how users attend to their own input and to a
particular system output. Consciousness qualifies the mental
process that leads to an action rather than the relationship
between the action and its outcome. Thus, it is not truly a
quality of interaction. For implicatures, the main entity is
the relationship between an action and its intended effect. A
commonality between different meanings is their reference
to the user’s mental attitude (or lack of it) toward a particular
entity. Thus, when dealing with implicitness we are deal-
ing with phenomena that is not directly observable; claims
about implicitness relies on inferences from other units of
observation.
The lack of direct observation is a general challenge for
research and the previous section already gave a glimpse
of the methodological differences between psychology and
different traditions in pragmatics regarding their approaches
toward mentalism. Work in psychology aims to find empir-
ical measures of mental processes for implicitness, which
has led to various experimental techniques such as Implicit
Association Test [34]. In linguistic pragmatics, implicitness
is determined by comparing what is meant by the speaker
against the verbal content of an utterance in a given context.
Unlike psychology, this often relies on the formal reasoning
by the analyst instead of “getting down to the messy business
of experimentation” [101, p. 280]. Psychology and linguistic
pragmatics both aim to reconstruct a first-person account
of mental phenomena from outside. Conversation analytic
and situated action perspectives, on the other hand, empha-
size the inherent vagueness of intentions, leading to their
methodological preference for the procedural analysis of
action over mental modeling. In doing so, they embrace a
third-person perspective of intentionality and study inten-
tions to the extent social agents publicly attribute them to
each other.
Various traditions in HCI inherited these different ap-
proaches toward mentalism. In contrast to psychology and
pragmatics, however, HCI deals with interactions where one
of the partners in interaction, the system, is the outcome
of design. Although a user’s mental state is not directly ob-
servable, the system behavior can be specified, enabling HCI
to make claims about implicitness through design. Conse-
quently, HCI research on implicit interaction emerged with
a strong constructive orientation toward building interfaces
that facilitate implicit interaction [51, 83]. This construc-
tive orientation is an additional source of methodological
challenges such as potential mismatches between the sys-
tem design and user experience perspectives. The following
section will examine these challenges in more detail.
3 METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
This section elaborates on the consequences of different
meanings for what we identify as the particular methodolog-
ical challenges of HCI’s constructive orientation, namely 1)
determining implicitness by design, 2) establishing design
and evaluation criteria and 3) scoping design problems.
Determining Implicitness by Design
Amethodological challenge concerning design is understand-
ing the extent users’ mental attitudes can be determined
through interface properties. Implicitness is occasionally
treated as a quality that is predetermined by design, inde-
pendent from the uncertainties of the actual user interaction.
This is most obvious in the phrase “implicit interface”, but
also apparent in other terms such as “proactiveness” [51],
“attentional demand” [51] or “predictability” [49] that re-
spectively define user intentionality, attentional focus and
awareness in terms of system properties. As such, implicit-
ness of the actual use experience is treated as unproblematic,
but the claim is ideally informed through a number of de-
sign decisions that favor unawareness or unintentionality.
For example, it can be hard for a user to comprehend causal
relationships between inputs and system effects, as in the
case of complex personalization algorithms or when there
is no salient feedback [56, 89]. Or, the input collected by the
system might not have any immediate consequences for a
user, such as when it is used for ranking search results [2]
or monitoring the audience engagement [38].
At the same time, it might not be possible to know users’
intentions or awareness in advance for a given situation, nor
there is any guarantee that they will remain static over time.
The uncertainties posed by situational factors pose a limita-
tion to determining implicitness through design. Among dif-
ferent accounts of implicit interaction, Dix has acknowledged
the “fluidity” between user attitudes for the same method
and introduced vocabulary to express their transitions [21].
Interactions can transition from incidental to expected when
users comprehend the causal relationships between their in-
puts and the system effects, and from expected to intended
when users co-opt to intentionally trigger an effect, as in
walking inside a motion-sensitive room to intentionally turn
on the lights. One can call all of these interactions implicit but
only in the loose sense of the word (alternatively meaning
unaware, unintentional and implicature).
Dix uses constructed examples to describe incidental, ex-
pected and intended interactions, but implicit as a contin-
gent quality suggests making the validation of implicitness
part of the evaluation. For example, Kuikkaniemi et al. start
with an a-priori distinction between implicit and explicit
feedback mechanisms in a first-person shooter game, but
interviews during the study show that some participants
became aware of the effect [56]. Fisk et al. report the eval-
uation of an “implicit-only” interface, where two remote
users could control a shared workspace only indirectly, by
talking to each other [31], but observe that the proposed
interaction method resulted in participants modifying the
flow of their conversation to control the shared workspace.
Verbal accounts and qualitative differences can be harder to
observe for low-level interactions, meaning that researchers
can expand their methodological toolbox into experimen-
tal techniques. For instance, Coyle et al. borrow the exper-
imental procedure of “intentional binding” from cognitive
neuroscience to assess the personal sense of agency based
on participants’ perceived time between input and effect for
pointing tasks [17].
Establishing Design and Evaluation Criteria
The constructive orientation of HCI also means that implicit
interactions are deliberately targeted by designers. Yet var-
ious meanings emphasize different motivations for design,
such as providing appropriate responses that go beyond
what the user has intended, freeing up attentional resources,
decreased need for cognitive processing (consciousness) or
accomplishing an intended effect with less effort (implica-
ture). Different motivations are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. Unintentional effects can also be at the attentional
background. Yet some are obviously so. Implicatures pre-
sume intentionality and rule out any unintended benefits.
With the exception of implicature, a common theme across
different meanings is their relaxed assumptions of mental rep-
resentation as a condition for good interaction. This position
diverges from the traditional HCI focus on predictability,
direct control and attentional bottlenecks.
Motivations emphasized by different meanings also differ
regarding their value as evaluation criteria. For example,
freeing up users’ attention for other tasks can be a design goal
in its own right, but this is less obvious when implicit stands
for unintentional or unaware; an interaction is not better
simply because an outcome is unintended or unexpected
(users’ ability to model the system behavior can even benefit
the task performance [70]). In this case, implicitness seems
more like a by-product rather than a design goal. This relates
to previous calls to formulate implicit interactions “less as
a hammer, and more as a lens” [52, p. 82], that is instead of
striving for making interactions implicit, designers should
consider their designs as facilitating implicit interactions.
A contentious issue across different meanings is the nor-
mative relevance of users’ prior intentions (i.e., users’ activity-
level end goals) for evaluation. One possible position is to
evaluate implicit interactions based on how effectively they
realize users’ inferred intentions [e.g., 30, 100]: Users’ prior
intentions remain the ultimate metric that the interactive
process is evaluated against, but unlike explicit interactions,
their successful accomplishment does not presuppose mental
representation and intentional execution. One limitation we
have noted with this position is that prior intentions can
be vague and negotiable, thus, not necessarily good criteria
for evaluation. A related methodological challenge is their
elicitation as independent ground truths.
An alternative position that we find more widely applica-
ble is to consider interface design as oriented towards provid-
ing system responses that are expected to be appropriate in
retrospect, without any commitments to prior intentions at-
tributed to the user. What is appropriate can be operationally
defined in terms of user acceptance, performance gains or
any other utility. Even so, different meanings point to dif-
ferent degrees of constructive validity regarding how implic-
itness translates into other utilities. For instance, whether
an interface results in better task performance because it
frees up users’ attention through automation or because the
action is done unconsciously through habituation points to
different expectations about user skill. In some cases, what is
appropriate can be defined in terms of benefits to other par-
ties. It these cases, we find it necessary to establish whether
the expected benefit depends on users’ unawareness such
as when the interaction involves a trade-off (assuming that
the users will adjust their behavior once they become aware
of the trade-off). Additionally, to ensure unawareness or
unintentionality, researchers might want to avoid setting
clear goals or disclosing their evaluation criteria to their par-
ticipants. This differs from many controlled studies where
experimental tasks act as proxies for user intentions.
Scoping Design Problems
We use the word “scope” to denote the design problem of
deciding which interactions should be targeted as implicit.
Previous work stressed the foundation of implicit interac-
tions on existing use patterns [52, 83] or actions the user
“would have had to perform anyway” for a primary task [41,
p. 33]. For example, public displays can facilitate implicit in-
teractions by sensing people’s naturally occurring presence
and orientation in physical space [7, 96]. Or, consider eye
movements that have long been identified as an input for im-
plicit interaction [60, 95, 106]. An argument for their use in
many applications is their “naturalness” [106]; people need
to monitor the environment to guide their actions. A subse-
quent design strategy has been employing eye movement
data for implicit interactions (e.g., moving the mouse cursor
[107] or personalizing search results [14]). Yet a designer can
also approach the problem from a different perspective, by
acknowledging that eye movements are largely shaped by
existing design decisions such as attention-demanding GUIs.
This can in turn lead to various alternative design strategies
that decrease the need for visual attention. Thus, designers
are confronted with a practical choice of whether they treat
the existing use patterns as pregiven or modifiable.
Another issue related to the design scope is determining
which particular interactions should not be targeted as im-
plicit interactions. A design prediction from early research is
that, for many applications, implicit interactions will occur
alongside with explicit interactions [51, 83]. Previous theoriz-
ing provides at least two possible reasons for the continued
existence of explicit interactions.
First reason is the aforementioned foundation of implicit
interactions on a purposeful or attention-demanding primary
activity [21, 41, 83]. In some cases, this activity can be exter-
nal to a system, thus not part of the interaction. For example,
navigation in physical space is often external to an interactive
system, but can be utilized by a mobile service for providing
contextual data. At the same time, as our interaction with the
world is increasingly being mediated by computers, we can
expect to encounter many cases where a primary activity is
part of the interaction, such as in computer-mediated com-
munication or many productivity tasks. For example, implicit
feedback for search systems can rely on actions that users
perform anyway to examine or share information [2, 76, 99].
In these cases, explicit interaction becomes a prerequisite for
implicit interaction.
The second reason is the potential failure of design as-
sumptions or system inferences. In HCI, it is generally ac-
knowledged that system inference can fail or design deci-
sions can prove inadequate during interaction [8, 9, 45]. The
inference mechanisms and design assumptions that implicit
interactions rely on are no exception. Consider auto-rotation
of the screen content in mobile interfaces based on the device
orientation. While helpful in many cases, this adaptation can
be inappropriate when the user is lying down [41]. In infor-
mation retrieval, a user’s inferred interest does not always
match with what the user finds relevant. Thus, researchers
turned to quantify the prediction accuracies for different
types of implicit feedback [e.g., 32, 50]. The challenge can
to an extent be addressed by developing better models to
decrease failures. When near-perfect accuracy is not possi-
ble, relying solely on implicit interactions can be impractical,
leading to their combination with interaction methods that
facilitate explicit interactions.
4 DEPLOYING AN UPDATED DEFINITION
We reviewed various meanings of implicit and identified
their consequences in regards to the entity, motivation and
the constructive validity of implicitness. In this section, we
provide and deploy an updated definition based on the un-
derstanding of implicit interaction in terms of intentionality.
We define implicit interactions as interactions in which the
appropriateness of a system response to the user input (i.e., an
effect) does not rely on the user having conducted the input to
intentionally achieve it.
Implicit interactions thus differ from explicit interactions
where the appropriateness relies on the assumption that the
user has performed an action to intentionally achieve a par-
ticular effect or, conversely, has abstained from performing
an action to avoid a particular effect. For implicit interactions,
appropriateness of a particular effect is instead understood
from the user input, but does not rely on the user’s intentional-
ity. An input refers to any kind of data that originates from
the user that is available to the system. An effect refers to
any outcome that is facilitated as a result of this user action
or data, either with or without system mediation. For ex-
ample, walking into a room facilitates navigation in space,
but can also cause the lights to turn on in the presence of
a motion sensor. The formulation of interaction in terms of
causal input–effect relationships is not new (see [22, 23]),
but has not been previously used to study implicit interac-
tions. Below, we illustrate how specifying an input–effect
relationship (or shortly an input–effect pair) as the entity
of interaction can help us address the previously identified
challenges.
walk into a room navigate in space
turn the lights on
walk into a room
toggle the switch
navigate in space
turn the lights on
Figure 1: Depiction of implicit (above) and explicit (below)
ways of turning on the lights. The dashed line shows an
input–effect pair that is expected to be implicit. A com-
mon pattern in implicit interactions is the co-occurrence (or
bundling) of multiple effects as a result of the same input,
eliminating the need for additional actions.
Combining Input–Effect Relationships
The previous section, without going into the details, made
the case that implicit interactions will exist alongside explicit
interactions. Here, we elaborate on various possible combi-
nations by specifying the entity of implicit as an input–effect
pair. Let’s start with our observation that implicit interac-
tions often assume the presence of a primary and intentional
activity. When viewed through the lens of input–effect pairs,
this translates into situations in which an input leads to mul-
tiple effects. Some of these effects are intended by the user
and can explain why the user has conducted the action in
the first place. Other effects can be unintentional but still
appropriate for a given situation. The expected benefits of
implicit interactions can then be attributed to the decreased
user effort that is achieved through this bundling (Figure 1)
instead of an effect being unintentional.
What is appropriate for a given situation is not always
known in advance, a consideration that calls for various
additional interactions. First, reaching a particular effect can
involve a complementary input–effect pair. For example,
Buscher et al. utilize eye movements to model user interests
when interacting with a search system [14], but their system
retrieves the actual search results only after a typed query to
manage the low accuracy of the user model that is inferred
from eye movement data (Figure 2a). In another example,
Buschek et al. reinforce “explicit” authentication methods
(i.e., typing a password on a mobile device) with less accurate
“implicit” authentication methods (i.e., using biometric data)
as an additional layer of security [13]. In these examples, the
ultimate execution of a particular effect (retrieving search
results or logging into a mobile device) requires an additional
interaction that is expected to be intentional.
Secondly, the system can allow falling back to a corrective
input–effect pair when the design assumption or the system
inference proves to be wrong. Unlike the previous case, this
involves modifying an effect that is designed to be implicit
after it has been executed. For instance, an intelligent white-
board can organize a user’s sketched notes as visual clusters,
but the user can intentionally “override” these clusters if he
or she disagrees with the system interpretation [51] (Figure
2b).
a) Complementary use of additional interactions [14]
eye movements
+ typed query
model user interest
return search results
read the text
b) Modifying a parameter with another input [51]
sketch
+ redraw
cluster the inks override the cluster
ink on the whiteboard
c) Equivalent methods that achieve the same effect
type text
“save” command
edit text
save the document
Figure 2: Diagrams showing an interaction that is designed
to be implicit (dashed lines) within the context of other in-
teractions.
Finally, there can be cases of false negatives, namely situ-
ations in which the system fails to provide an appropriate
response when needed. For example, a text editor can utilize
a user’s editing actions as a trigger for auto-saving the doc-
ument, but the user might also want to save the document
without having towait for the auto-save functionality (Figure
2c). These situations require the presence of an equivalent
method in the interface that achieves the same effect.
Determining the Implicitness of an Effect
Specifying the entity of implicit also directs us to the more
precise question of whether prior expectations of implicit-
ness matches with users’ reported mental attitudes toward
an input–effect pair. Let’s illustrate this by reviewing pre-
vious work through the lens of the updated definition. In
their study of messaging applications, Hoyle et al. initially
designate “read receipts” (i.e., visual notices that inform the
sender that the receiver has opened the message) as “implicit”
effects that occur as a by-product of viewing the message
[47] (Figure 3a). Yet their interviews show that read receipts
can be an explicit effect, such as when users abstain from
opening messages to avoid informing the other party of their
action.
a) Interactions with a messaging application [47]
open the message view the message
send a read receipt
b) Interactions with a social music listening service [88]
click play play the track
modify the public profile
c) Interactions with a learning thermostat [105]
set temperature adjust the current temperature
modify the thermostat model
Figure 3: Depictions of input–effect pairs that are expected
to be explicit and implicit (respectively shown as solid and
dashed lines). The implicitness of a particular input–effect
pair contradicts prior expectations in each example.
Outside implicit interaction literature, interviews have
shown that users can put extra effort to achieve or modify
seemingly implicit effects. Silfverberg et al. report a partic-
ular social media-linked music listening practice in which
users hit the “play” button, but for presenting themselves
as listening to a particular track in their social media pro-
file instead of actually listening to it [88]. In this case, the
input (hitting the play button) results in two effects, play-
ing the music track and changes in the user’s social media
profile (Figure 3b). Contrary to the expectations, it is the
latter effect that is intended by the user. Yang and Newman
investigate the use practices that emerge around a learning
thermostat [105]. When a user sets a new temperature, the
thermostat facilitates both the instant effect of changing the
temperature and the long-term effect of building a model
of user preferences (Figure 3c). A finding from their inter-
views is that users can adapt their behavior of setting the
temperature to prevent unwanted adaptations once they re-
alize the limitations of the device’s learning capability. Note
that, in the above-mentioned cases, the explicitness of the
interaction is not negative per se; the observations rather ex-
emplify situations in which users adjust their mental attitude
to compensate for the inappropriate system behavior.
Finally, we see a more precise definition helpful for rea-
soning about implicitness through interface properties, by
expanding the scope of analysis from isolated “implicit in-
teractions” to the application context an input–effect pair is
situated in. For instance, among different effects that result
from the same input method, some can be more visible, thus
more likely to be noticed and intended by the user. Or, among
equivalent input methods that lead to the same effect, some
can require less interaction steps than others or require less
skill, increasing the likelihood of that particular input for
intentionally producing the effect.
The reasoning can be developed further by paying at-
tention to the combination of different input–effect pairs.
Consider our observation that implicit interactions are often
enabled by other effects that are caused by the same input;
bundling of multiple effects is a source of uncertainty for
attributing user intentions to observable behavior. On the
other hand, lack of an equivalent method for achieving a
certain effect increases the likelihood that a particular input–
effect pair becomes explicit. For example, a text editor can
utilize users’ editing actions as a trigger for auto-saving the
document, but in the absence of a “save” command, users
can resort to editing the document as a means to trigger
an auto-save. Previous work documents such instances in
which interactions that were designed to be “implicit-only”
turned out to be intentional and at the focus of users’ atten-
tion because they were the only means to reach a specific
outcome [31].
5 DISCUSSION: ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
FOR RESEARCH
HCI has long acknowledged that interactional achievements
can depend on external conditions that have no mental coun-
terpart in a user’s mind. Designing for implicit interactions
represent a constructive take on this insight by expanding
the scope of design to unintentional and by potentially in-
creasing the role of external dependencies even further. We
identified the particular methodological challenges of this
Table 2: A list of additional considerations for research.
Determining implicitness by design: Do users’ men-
tal attitudes match with prior research or design expec-
tations (if so, in which cases)? How do they adapt over
time in relation to a design intervention?
Establishing criteria for design and evaluation:
What are the assumptions about what is appropriate
(from the perspective of the designers and the users)?
To what extent do users’ prior intentions represent what
is appropriate? Does the expected benefit of a design in-
tervention depends on the interaction being implicit (i.e.,
if a targeted implicit effect turns out to be explicit, is it
still beneficial)?
Scoping design problems: Which effects are bundled
together (co-occur as a result of the same input)? How
does the bundling of effects make certain interaction
outcomes harder? Are there any equivalent methods for
achieving the same effect or correcting it? How does
designing for implicit interaction can reinforce or modify
existing use practices?
constructive orientation and showed how an updated defi-
nition can be deployed to address them with greater preci-
sion. While our analysis focused on the diverse uses of the
term implicit interaction, we find the exposed challenges
representative of more general concerns in HCI, namely the
conceptualization of user and system agencies through de-
sign and the role of user intentions in research. Below, we
discuss the broader implications of our analysis and identify
additional considerations for design and evaluation. These
are presented as a checklist of actionable research questions
in Table 2.
Taking Implicit “Interaction” Seriously
First of all, framing implicitness as an interaction quality
emphasizes the aspect of situational accomplishment; implic-
itness is not a design feature but an empirical claim about
users’ state in a given situation. Beyond terminological pre-
cision, what is the value of this insight for how we design
and evaluate interfaces? If interfaces themselves are not im-
plicit or explicit, what are they? And if implicitness is accom-
plished through interaction, how does it inform design?
For design, what is more consequential than the explicit–
implicit dichotomy are the assumptions they rely on, namely
designer’s expectations about users’ goals and what is ap-
propriate for a given use case. These assumptions guide the
practical design problems of bundling different effects or
providing complementary input–effect relationships. Thus,
even though interfaces themselves are not implicit, they can
be expressed in the intention-agnostic language of different
input–effect relationships. Distinguishing designers’ assump-
tions from the actual interface properties is important as it
exposes the role of interface in promoting or precluding dif-
ferent interaction outcomes. For example, an understanding
of implicit as predetermined by design puts emphasis on the
decreased user effort achieved through bundling multiple
effects. Yet it can obscure how bundling multiple effects can
make certain interaction outcomes harder, such as opening
a message without sending a read receipt or adjusting the
room temperature without changing the user model of the
thermostat.
For evaluation, framing implicit as a quality of interaction
calls for paying attention to users’ actual mental attitudes
and their long-term adaptations. Systems that are designed
to facilitate implicit interaction often build on users’ existing
action routines to facilitate additional appropriate effects.
The implicitness of an effect is then grounded on the expec-
tation that user goals or actions will remain unchanged after
a design intervention. What is missed in this conception is
how design interventions can invalidate such expectations
if users reformulate their goals in relation to these effects
or avoid certain actions to prevent what they perceive as
unwanted effects.
While our discussion focused on the term implicit, the
relevance for similar concepts should be obvious. Distinc-
tions between “user-controlled” versus “mixed-initiative”[3],
“proactive” [59, 80, 104], “adaptive” or “automatic” often re-
state user intentionality in terms of system properties. Yet
whether a system proactively adapts its behavior in response
to the user input, or whether the users intentionally exploits
the system adaptation cannot be stated independently from
their knowledge and goals in a particular situation. Here,
our emphasis parallels previous insights on foreground–
background as situational properties [92], the accomplish-
ment of meaning through interaction [24], and more recent
criticisms against the use of qualifiers such as “natural” or
“intuitive” [11, 68, 98] to describe interfaces. Thus, part of
the problem can be attributed to a confusing mixture of ex-
periential and system properties. That said, we distinguish
this mixture from the more productive efforts of anticipating
and designing for implicitness. And this is where we see the
value of conceptual precision; a testable definition enables
researchers to specify why implicitness is pursued and how
prior design assumptions can be validated.
User Intentions from Normative to Descriptive
Finally, we frame designing for implicit interactions as part
of a broader change in attitude in HCI that prioritizes ap-
propriateness of action outcomes over their intentionality.
Accompanying this shift is the changing role of user inten-
tions from normative (i.e., as setting the evaluative standard
of interaction [44]) to descriptive: Intentions can explain why
the user has performed an action or found a system response
appropriate, but as mental antecedents they provide incom-
plete resources for activity completion and can be negotiable.
Thus, instead of taking the normativeness of user intentions
for granted, researchers should treat the extent user intentions
become a measure of user acceptance as an empirical question
by taking situational factors such as users’ capacity to model
and control system behavior into account. Consequently, we
argue for the need to expand the scope of evaluation from
performance metrics and observable breakdowns to assess-
ing how different interface configurations subtly influence
user behavior and lead to qualitatively different outcomes.
Interface mediation in turn emphasizes the normative as-
pect of designing and the role of the designers in conceptual-
izing what is appropriate for a given situation. In HCI and
design, similar thoughts led some to expand the notion of
normative intentionality to artifacts under the phrases “ma-
terial intentionality” [94] or “design with intent” [58]. Yet we
observe that these discussions have been relatively absent in
the context of implicit interactions. Normative aspect of de-
signing becomes particularly relevant when user intentions
are treated as incentives for end goals that are designed to
benefit other parties. Potential trade-offs in these situations
point to ethical questions related to users’ informed consent
and the distribution of burden and benefit.
6 CONCLUSION
In the wake of increased sensing capabilities and complex
inference mechanisms, the concept of implicit interaction
is ever more relevant. In this paper, we have drawn atten-
tion to the present ambiguity of the term and analyzed the
consequences of different meanings for establishing why
we facilitate implicit interactions and how we validate its
benefits. In the most general level, our investigation is a call
for researchers and designers to specify their particular use
of implicit interaction instead of treating the term as self-
evident. Our review provides a reference for future work
by clarifying the differences between various meanings. We
see the conceptual clarity brought by as a necessary step for
larger, more systematic reviews.
In more particular, we call for paying closer attention
to the implications of defining explicit–implicit distinction
through intentionality and as a quality of an input–effect re-
lationship in order to address the methodological challenges
with greater precision. Importantly, we stress implicitness as
something accomplished through interaction, which high-
lights the need to critically examine what prior distinctions
of implicit and explicit presume about users’ goals, their ca-
pacity to model the system behavior and what is appropriate
for a given situation. We expect the additional considera-
tions to be helpful as interfaces that aim to facilitate implicit
interactions increasingly go beyond proof-of-concept and
are deployed in more complex settings.
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